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INTRODUCTION
Significant economic research of recent years has posited,
debated, and attempted to prove empirically the hypothesis that
land tenure security can promote sustainable economic growth in
emerging economies.' For land tenure security to subsist, in turn,
economists have theorized and empirically shown that emerging
economies should maintain institutions that recognize and enforce
property rights.
Development experts and legislators need more than broad
economic theory, however, if they are to guide an emerging nation
to land tenure security and the economic benefits that are believed
to ensue. The next steps in this effort require legal analysts2 to
advise regarding (a) where risks lie to land tenure security and (b)
means by which an emerging nation may reduce those risks.
Developing a property rights institution-a set of laws or rules
recognizing and defining private property rights along with
1. See generally, e.g., LEE ALrON ET AL., TITLES, CONFLICT, AND LAND USE: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND REFORM ON THE BRAzaUAN FRONTIER (1999);
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPrTALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL]; HERNANDO
DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISmLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (1989)
[hereinafter DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH]; KLAUS DEININGER, WORLD BANK, LAND POLICIES FOR
GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION (World Bank Policy Research Report 2003); WORLD BANK,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS (2002) [hereinafter
BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS]; Lee Alston et al., The Determinants and Impact of
Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 25 (1996);
Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence front Ghana,
103 J. POL. ECON. 903 (1995); Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, Land Reform, Poverty
Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India, 115 Q.J. ECON. 389 (2000); Arthur A. Goldsmith,
Democracy, Property Rights and Economic Growth, 32 J. DEV. STUD. 157 (1995); Jeswald W.
Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the
Third World, 33 INT'L LAW. 875 (1999); Johan Torstensson, Property Rights and Economic
Growth: An Empirical Study, 47 KYKLOs 231 (1994); Deniz Baharoglu, The World Bank,
World Bank Experience in Land Management & The Debate on Tenure Security (July 2002)
(unpublished draft report), available at httpJ/Avww.worldbank.org/urban/publicat/land-
final.pdf.
2. See generally Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1737, 1739
(2002) (calling upon legal academics to assist economists in the field of development by
pragmaticallydetermining which legal institutions and laws facilitate the economic well-being
of nations).
1012 [Vol. 45:1011
EXAMPLES FROM CHINA
enforcement mechanisms and supporting organizations 3 -does not
alone ensure land tenure security. One reason is that risks to land
tenure security exist when the goals of an emerging economy's
property rights institution are thwarted by that new institution's
own vagaries and failures of process, by the nation's other institu-
tions, and by inconsistent local norms.
This Article identifies some of the unexpected sources of risk to
owners' and investors' land tenure security. The Article also
illustrates means of reducing risks to land tenure security in order
to enhance availability of credit, stimulate foreign investment, and
create a market for mortgage-backed debt. The goal of this Article
is to give development specialists a beginning point for assessing,
and then increasing, compatibility of an emerging country's
institutions with its land tenure security and economic development
goals.
Illustrations will be drawn from the People's Republic of China of
types of unapparent risks that can result in loss of rights to land or
frustrate investors' expectations. Illustrations also will be drawn
from China's efforts to create new institutions and to strengthen
existing legal institutions in order to enhance land tenure security
and access to credit.
I. BENEFITS TO EMERGING ECONOMIES FROM LAND TENURE
SECURITY4
A. Contribution of Land Tenure Security to Credit Enhancement
and a Sustainable Market Economy
Land tenure security is essential to stimulate the development of
land.' If land tenure is not secure, both local and foreign investors
will be hesitant to invest in land development. Economists and
international development specialists posit further that land tenure
security not only stimulates a market for land and its development,6
3. See id.
4. This part borrows substantially from Joyce Palomar, Land Tenure Security as a
Market Stimulator in China, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 7 (2002).
5. See JEFF GATES, THE OWNERSHIP SoLuTION xxvi (1998) (stating that "property's value
derives largely from the confidence people place in its security").
6. See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 1, at 46-47.
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but that this security is the very foundation of a market economy'
and sustainable economic growth.8 Economists and development
7. See id. at 6-7; see also GATES, supra note 5, at xxviii (stating that "[flree enterprise
policymakers can no longer afford to be agnostic about ownership patterns"); GERHARD
LARSSON, LAND REGISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (1991). Mancur Olson writes
concerning the creation and sustenance of a market economy-
It is becoming clear that a country cannot obtain a competitive market economy
simply by repealing communism and making sure that the government does not
interfere with .the economy. A thriving market economy does not emerge
automatically. It requires institutions that most people in the economically
developed democracies unthinkingly take for granted, but that the emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe and the societies of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America usually do not have.
A thriving market economy apparently requires, among other things,
institutions that provide secure individual rights-that insure that individuals,
and the firms that they create, can best advance their interests by being as
productive as possible and engaging in mutually beneficial trade. The incentives
to save and to invest depend upon individual rights to marketable assets-on
property rights.
Even in some of the countries where all the foregoing rights are available,
they are not secure. Some dictatorships have, at times, provided individuals with
the rights needed for competitive markets and thereby brought about periods of
rapid economic growth. Yet the dictators' subjects have not only lacked political
freedoms, but also any confidence that their property and contract rights will
continue to be respected if the regime, or even the dictator's policy, changes.
Thus the market rights do not elicit as much investment and economic advance
as would have occurred if everyone were confident that they would last.
Mancur Olson, The IRIS Idea: The Needed Research, Ctr. for Institutional Reform & the
Informal Sector, at http'/www.iris.umd.edu/researchneededresearch.asp (last visited Feb.
5, 2004).
8. Ian Williamson writes:
The pivotal tension of sustainable development is between the environment and
the pressures of human activity. It is the system of recognising, controlling and
mediating rights, restrictions and responsibilities over land and resources that
forms the fulcrum. Thus "land administration" can and should play an important
role in the infrastructure for sustainable development.... In this context,
"Sustainable development means development that effectively incorporates
economic, social, political, conservation and resource management factors in
decision-making for development. The challenge of balancing these competing
tensions in sophisticated decision making requires access to accurate and
relevant information in a readily interactive form."
A common fault of some LAS [Land Administration System] projects around
the world is that they focus on the technical aspects of the project, such as
mapping, adjudication, surveying and preparation of titles, and sometimes forget
the main objective for the project. Such projects are never about land titling per
se, nor should they be. They are about facilitating sustainable development, land
markets, social justice, institutional reform, poverty eradication, environmental
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experts agree that "[miodern capital markets generate economic
growth in part because formalized property rights remove uncer-
tainty, which lowers transaction costs .... Wvithout formal property
[relationships], ... a modern social market economy cannot exist."'9
When property rights become secure, citizens can depend upon
these rights in participating in private transactions. Economic
historians cite the late eighteenth century experience in Western
economies as an illustration of the relationship between property
rights and the emergence of the modern market: "the boom in
technological innovation in the West, and the massive investment
that made it possible, began only at the end of the eighteenth
century, when property rights were perfected and made independent
of politics."'°
When land titles and land tenure are secure, landholders may
utilize their property rights as collateral for loans. When lenders are
confident that their titles or liens against real property collateral
will be enforceable, they will accept interests in land as security for
loans in amounts up to the fair market value of the property
interest. Thus, secure land titles and enforceable mortgage rights
together create access to significant amounts of capital." In the
management or addressing regional income disparities.
Ian P. Williamson, Best Practices for Land Administration Systems in Developing Countries,
in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAND POLICY REFORM 6, 17 (2000) (citations omitted).
Additionally, "land administration and cadastral systems ... 'are not ends in themselves. They
support effective land markets, increased agricultural productivity, sustainable economic
development, environmental management, political stability and social justice.'- Id. at 26
(citation omitted).
9. GATES, supra note 5, at 224 (citation omitted); see also Pitman B. Potter, Globalisation
and Local Legal Culture, Dilemmas of China's Use of Liberal Ideals of Private Property Rights,
2 AusTL. J. ASIAN L. 1, 7 (2000) (citing Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 2 (1990)).
Among the organizations currently supporting research into practical applications of this
theory for emerging economies are the following: World Bank's Land Policy Network; United
Nations Development Programme; United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization; Institute
of Liberty and Democracy; World Business Council for Sustainable Development; Center for
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS); The Adam Smith Institute (UK); Center
for Ethics, Capital Markets, and Political Economy;, Frontiers of Freedom Institute; AVINA
Foundation; Foundation for Enterprise Development; and U.S. Agency for International
Development.
10. DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 177.
11. Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto has published empirical evidence of how the
lack of secure title to land in Peru inhibits economic development. See DE SoO, THE OTHER
PATH, supra note 1, at 13. Lack of legal title means lack of secure collateral, which means lack
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United States, for example, seventy percent of the credit extended
to new businesses stems from mortgaging real property titles as
collateral for loans.
12
With access to credit, individuals may improve their land, grow
crops, establish businesses, hire employees, pay wages, and
generate profits.'" The standard of living of landowners, business
owners, and their employees consequently will improve. 4 From
their increased profits and incomes, these individuals will have
capital to buy services and products from vendors whose incomes
and businesses also will improve. From all these increased incomes,
profits, and property values, taxes will be paid, thereby increasing
the nation's income. Empirical studies in Thailand,15 Costa Rica,'"
Peru, 7 and other countries comparing the level of investment and
productivity on titled and untitled farms support this hypothesis. 8
of access to credit. De Soto found, conversely, that land development and investment in
improvements and technology increased when occupants gained legal title to their land. See
also Kerry A. Dolan, Waking Dead Capital, FORBES, May 15, 2000, at 99.
12. GATES, supra note 5, at 223.
13. See generally Tim Hanstad, Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing
Countries, 13 AM. U. INTV. L. REV. 647, 702-03 (1998) ("Land registration systems contribute
toward solving production, credit, poverty, and employment problems.").
14. "Poverty is cured not with money but by gaining access to the productiveness-the
skill and the tools-required to earn money." GATES, supra note 5, at 33 (citing Robert
Ashford, The Binary Economics of Louis Kelso: A Democratic Private Property System for
Growth and Justice, in CURING WORLD POVERTY-THE NEw ROLE OF PROPERTY (John H.
Miller ed., 1994)).
15. See Hanstad, supra note 13, at 658-59 (citing GERSHON FEDER ET AL., LAND POLICIES
AND FARM PRODUCTIVITYIN THAILAND 28,94-108,148-53 (1988)); Laurence D. Stifel, Patterns
of Land Ownership in Central Thailand During the 20th Century, 64 J. SIAM SOC'Y 1,237-74
(1976).
16. See Mitchell A. Seligson, Agrarian Reform in Costa Rica: The Impact of the Title
Security Program, 35 INTER-AM. ECON. AFF. 31,31-56 (1982).
17. DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 31-32.
18.
Some related empirical studies reviewed by Feder and Nishio (1998) found that
land registration led to: higher land values in Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia,
Honduras, Brazil and Peru; higher investments in land in Costa Rica, Brazil,
Honduras, Jamaica and Ghana; and higher output and income in Costa Rica,
Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay.... Empirical evidence in support of the positive
impact of land registration on investment is available from studies conducted in
Thailand, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica and Ghana.... [An increase in
investment demand and credit supply associated with land registration leads to
more investment, greater use of variable inputs, higher output per unit of land,
greater income and higher land values. This contention is supported by
empirical evidence from Thailand, Honduras, Philippines, Brazil, Indonesia and
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Conversely, when land titles are not secured by law, people
cannot transfer their property easily.'9 They cannot develop it for
more valuable purposes or utilize it as collateral for credit.2 ° This
Zimbabwe....
FRANK BYAMUGISHA, THE EFFECTS OF LAND REGISTRATION ON FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH: A THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEwORK 12 (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 2240, 1999).
19.
The possession of a title can be an important determinant of the degree of tenure
security. [A study of] the impact of land policies on farm productivity in
Thailand, showed that the higher the degree of tenure security, the higher the
demand for investment, especially for goods and services that become attached
to land. Access to the formal credit system is easier for titled farmers because
they represent a lower risk for the lending institutions. A larger supply of formal
long-term credit (usually cheaper than credit obtained in informal markets)
helps to further increase the rate of investment. Tenure security also increases
access to short-term credit, which in turn leads to greater use of variable inputs.
Consequently, output per hectare, the price of land, and income are higher for
titled farmers.
A relevant consideration is often the probability of eviction. The lower this
probability, the greater the incentive for farmers to invest in land-attached
improvements and for the formal credit system to extend credit. In regions
where tenure insecurity is pervasive, the price of land will not reflect the present
value of the income stream associated with the exploitation of land for
agricultural production because not all land rights are legitimate or enforceable
under the law....
Tenure insecurity also precludes "landowners" in the urban sector from using
this preferred form of collateral in the formal credit market. As in agriculture,
it can be a binding constraint for potential borrowers, particularly for the more
financially fragile. Similarly, tenure insecurity reduces the incentive to invest,
especially in land-attached improvements. The capital-to-land ratio in the
housing sector will accordingly be lower than otherwise. In peri-urban areas lack
of tenure security is widespread, and so the incentive for investment will be
reduced. In addition, ... tenure insecurity reduces the demand for house
improvements and government services.
Ant~nio Salazar P. Branddo & Gershon Feder, Regulatory Policies and Reform: The Case of
Land Markets, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 191,
195-96 (Claudio Frischtek ed., 1995) (citations omitted).
20. See id.; see also Brian Schwarzwalder, Land Registration, in WORLD BANK, WORLD
BANK TECHNICAL PAPER No. 436, LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE RURAL LAND RELATIONS
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA, A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 165 (Roy Prosterman
& Tim Hanstad eds., 1999) (commenting that when land transfers are made before a legal
framework has been created for ownership of interests in land, its transfer, and assurance of
ownership rights, the legal results will be unclear). For example, without a federal law on
registration of rights to land in the Kyrgyz Republic in Eastern Europe, registration of sales,
bequests, gifts, mortgages, and other transactions between private parties did not occur in the
countryside. Id. at 166. The lack of a legally based, functioning system for recording or
registering public land titles increased transactions costs. "[F] armers who mortgage their land
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
limits the productivity of the property and its value as a factor of
production.21 Effects on the general economy may include the
inability to increase productivity or investments, more expensive
capital, an inefficient tax system, and perhaps other negative effects
on a nation's development.22 According to Hernando de Soto:
If [occupiers of land who do not have legal-title] cannot enforce
their rights to land, housing, and equipment, their incentives for
investing in them are considerably reduced. People build less if
they think there is a risk that the state or another person might
take away or occupy what they have built.... The effect of all this
is to reduce aggregate investment.
Secure property rights, on the other hand, encourage holders
to invest in their property because of their certainty that the
property will not be usurped. From a strictly economic stand-
point, therefore, the true purpose of property rights is not to
benefit the individuals or entities holding those rights, but to
give them the incentive to increase the value of their assets by
investing, innovating, or combining them advantageously with
other resources, something which would have beneficial results
for society.'
B. Necessity of Land Tenure Security to Stimulate Foreign
Investment
As the previous section described, secure land titles may give
landowners access to credit and capital. The land tenure security
provided by a nation's public land title registration system may be
sufficient to encourage mortgage loans from local banks and
mortgage lenders. Emerging economies may benefit in additional
are required to submit stacks of paperwork, which they must gather from many different
sources." Id. To address this problem, Moldova recently enacted law providing for the creation
of a national system of county-level registration offices that will register all legal rights in
land. Id. However, it is estimated that the system will require several years to become fully
functional. In the interim period, uncertainty about titles that have been registered and about
titles conveyed without using the new procedures for registering land transactions is expected
to slow the development of a market for land. Id.
21. DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 159.
22. Id. at 175-77 (suggesting that other possible effects include limited technological
progress, increased utility rates, and difficulties in formulating macroeconomic policy).
23. Id. at 159-60.
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ways, however, if land titles are sufficiently secure to attract foreign
investors. Foreign investors willing to build factories and conduct
business in developing countries bring new capital into the emerg-
ing economy and provide employment and tax revenue that will
further economic growth. In order for investors to be willing either
to invest money in land development in emerging economies or to
accept borrowers' land as collateral for loans, investors must believe
that their investments are secure.24 When investing in projects that
involve land development or land use, foreign investors must be
certain that the land can be developed and utilized according to
their plans. Further, when accepting real property interests as
collateral for loans, foreign investors must be confident that the
right to the real property will be available to satisfy the debt.
C. Necessity of Land Tenure Security to Create a Market for a
Nation's Mortgage-Backed Debt and New Capital for Mortgage
Loans
An additional benefit when land titles are sufficiently secure to
attract investors is that a secondary market for mortgage-backed
debt may develop. Enabling local banks to sell their residential
mortgage-backed debt can help to make capital available for middle-
income housing. In the United States, debt backed by mortgages is
"securitized," that is, interests in the repayment of large mortgage-
backed loans or large pools of smaller mortgage-backed loans are
sold as securities both directly to large institutional investors and
indirectly to individuals who invest in mutual funds that hold
shares in real estate investment trusts." This secondary market for
24. As described by leading authorities, "[floreign investors seek the risk-reducing
characteristics that make up the rule of law." David J. Bledsoe & Roy L. Prosterman, Policy,
the Rule of Law, and Rural Land Reform in China, in RDI REPORTS ON FOREIGN AID AND
DEVELOPMENT No. 101, at 8 (2000) (citing Douglas Webb, Legal System Reform and Private
Sector Development in Developing Countries, in ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT AND THE LAW 45-65 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996)).
25. See generally JOYCE PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE LAW §§ 1:3, 19:1 (Supp. 2003); A
PRMIER ON SECURITIZATION 1-2 (Michael J. Fishman & Leon T. Kendall eds., 1996) (defining
securitization as "a process of packaging individual loans and other debt instruments,
converting the package into a security or securities, and enhancing their credit status or
rating to further their sale to third-party investors."). Another scholar has noted that
In the United States, as of December 31, 1996, more than $2.5 trillion
securitization securities were outstanding; nearly $670 billion securitization
20041 1019
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mortgage-backed loans is important because local development and
housing construction need not depend solely on the availability of
funds in that locality.2" Local lenders may trade their long-term
mortgage loans in the securities market for new capital that then
can be lent to new borrowers. The local lender, in turn, can sell
those mortgage loans in the securities market for new capital that
they subsequently can lend to new borrowers, yielding a steady
source of funding for home purchases and property development."
The trillions of dollars that investors have poured into the American
secondary mortgage market has been credited with, first, creating
a consistent flow of funds for home loans in the United States since
the mid-1940s," and second, stimulating the boom in commercial
real estate development in the 1990s. For rating agencies to rate
mortgage-backed securities highly and for recognized investment
banks to sponsor them, each mortgage lien must be valid and
enforceable.2 9 An active secondary market for mortgage loans is
transactions were done in 1996 alone.
In a securitization transaction, a firm takes some of its rights to receive
money (receivables) and conveys those rights to an entity (a "pool"). The pool
issues securities representing rights to receive cash flows from the pool. The
securities' terms are crafted to appeal to investors, and thus differ from the
terms of the underlying receivables. The pool sells the securities to investors in
private placements or public offerings, and pays the sales proceeds to the firm.
The firm receives cash for its receivables.
Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization: The Case of the Disappearing Political Risk, 38
VA. J. INTL L. 293, 300 (1998).
26. See Douglas Arner, Emerging Market Economies and Government Promotion of
Securitization, 12 DuKE J. CoMP. & INTL L. 505, 505-07 (2002); BYAMUGISHA, supra note 18,
at 12; Hill, supra note 25, at 328-29; see also DWIGHT JAFFEE & BERTRAND RENAUD,
STRATEGIES TO DEVELOP MORTGAGE MARKETS iN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 4 (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 1697, 1996).
27. Dwight Jaffee and Bertrand Renaud contend that a housing finance system and
mortgage market are integral parts of the overall development of an emerging economy's
financial sector. JAFFEE & RENAUD, supra note 26, at 4, 28.
28. PALOMAR, supra note 25, §§ 1:3, 19:1.
29. See id. § 19. Claire Hill explains that
The rating agencies' role in these transactions is critical. Securitization seeks to
attract investors who want securities of high, and readily ascertainable, quality.
Rating agencies reduce the quality inquiry to a simple one, two or three letter
code: AAA for the highest quality, AA for the next highest quality, A, for the next
highest quality, BBB, for the next highest, etc., until D. Securities rated BBB or
higher are investment grade; securities rated below BBB are speculative, or in
some circles, "junk." A rating reflects the agency's assessment of the likelihood
that the security will be paid in accordance with its terms.
1020 [Vol. 45:1011
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created only if investors believe that mortgage-backed loans are
relatively safe in comparison to their yield. In the United States,
despite institutions of private property rights and the rule of law,
the security necessary to stimulate a secondary mortgage market
was accomplished only with the requirement of private mortgage
insurance and title insurance3 0 on every mortgage lien intended for
sale into the secondary mortgage market.
Referring to the example of China, since China amended its
Constitution and Land Administration Law to permit the transfer
of "land use rights" to private persons,3' the market for privately
Hill, supra note 25, at 312.
30. The title insurance policy obtained by a mortgage lender continues to cover assignees
or successors in ownership of the indebtedness. See PALOMAR, supra note 25, § 4:8, App. E-6.
31. XIANFA [Constitution] art. 10, sec. 4 (amended 1988) (P.R.C.) ("Land use rights may
be assigned in accordance with the laws and regulations."), translated in ISABELLE I. H. WAN
Er AL., A PROFESSIONAL'S GUIDE TO P.R.C. LAND LEGISLATION 103 (1999); Law of the People's
Republic of China on Land Administration, ch. 1, art. 2 (amended 1998) [hereinafter Land
Law], translated in WAN ET AL., supra ("Land use rights may be assigned according to law.").
In this Article, I have used the English translations of China's Constitution (XIANFA), laws,
and regulations found in WAN Er AL., supra. For further discussion of China's land use laws,
see PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR. & LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW 125 (2000); Donald
C. Clarke & Nicholas C. Howson, Developing P.R.C. Property and Real Estate Law: Revised
Land Registration Rules, 18 E. ASIAN EXEcuTivE REP. 12 (1996). Pursuant to the Law of 1994,
"land use right granted by the state can be transferred in the market as property .... [Land
use rights] can also be leased and mortgaged." CAO PEI, REAL ESTATE LAW IN CHINA 65 (1998).
The Several Regulations on Definition of Land Ownership And Land Use Rights, National
Land Administration Bureau (May 1, 1995) and the Regulations on the Implementation of the
Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China, State Council (Jan. 4, 1991),
define the aforementioned property rights over land in China.
In 1990, China also enacted regulations allowing the conveyance of long-term land use
rights to businesses for the purpose of development. Provisional Regulations of the People's
Republic of China Regarding the Grant and Assignment of State-Owned Land Use Rights in
Urban Areas (1990) [hereinafter Urban Land Grant and Assignment Regulations], translated
in WAN ET AL., supra, at 2097; see also Provisional Regulations for Administration of Foreign
Investment in Development and Operation of Tracts of Land (1990), translated in WAN ETAL.,
supra, at 2109-14. China also enacted new land registration rules. See Implementing Rules
for the Law of the People's Republic of China on Land Administration (1998) [hereinafter
Land Law Implementing Rules], translated in WAN ET AL., supra, at 2083-96; Rules on Land
Registration, State Land Administration (1995) [hereinafter Rules on Land Registration],
translated in WAN ET AL., supra, at 2121-40; see also Potter, supra note 9, at 12.
To promote further the development of a market for real estate, the National People's
Congress promulgated additional laws for the administration of urban real estate in 1994.
PEI, supra, at 32.
Though the State may transfer land use rights to private persons and entities, the right of
ownership of the land remains vested in either the State or an agricultural collective. The
land use rights transferred may be "granted land use rights" provided in exchange for value
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owned apartments has more than flourished. Individuals finance
their purchases with twenty- or thirty-year home mortgage loans. 2
At this time, the Bank of China finances all these residential
mortgage loans with state money.33 If, instead of holding all this
debt for twenty or thirty years, the Bank of China could sell
packages of thousands of its residential mortgage loans into the
world's securities markets and, thus, make private capital available
for residential mortgage lending, this process could generate
trillions in state resources for the funding of other projects. This
source of capital for residential mortgage loans, however, will not
become available until China's property rights institution and other
institutions complement one another. Private mortgages must be
proven enforceable 3' over a long enough period of time to permit
rating agencies and investment banks to rate China's residential
mortgage-backed securities highly, and the necessary financing
techniques and legal structures must be made available for modern
securitization of mortgage-backed debt.
for specific terms of years to domestic or foreign corporations, enterprises, other entities and
individuals. See Law of the People's Republic of China for the Administration of Urban Real
Estate, ch. 2, § 1, art. 7 (adopted July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Urban Real
Estate Law], translated in WAN ET AL., supra, at 2060-61; Land Grant and Assignment
Regulations, ch. 11 (1990), translated in WAN ET AL., supra, at 2109-10; RANDOLPH & Lou,
supra, at 132; Clarke & Howson, supra, at 12.
Alternatively, the State may convey "allocated land use rights," which are rights to use and
occupy land for designated public purposes without payment of value, other than a small
annual tax or "land use fee." Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 2, § 2, art. 22, translated in WAN ET
AL., supra, at 2064; Provisional Regulations GoverningAllocated Land Use Rights, Decree No.
1, State Land Administration (1992) [hereinafter Allocated Land Use Rights Regulations],
translated in WAN ET AL., supra, at 2141; Clarke & Howson, supra, at 12. In general, holders
of granted land use rights may sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise transfer them. Urban Real
Estate Law, ch. 4, translated in WAN ET AL., supra, at 2066-72. Conversely, holders of
allocated land use rights may not transfer them, unless the holder first receives the State's
permission to convert the allocated land use right to a granted land use right. Id.; Allocated
Land Use Rights Regulations, translated in WAN ET AL., supra, at 2141; see also Land Grant
and Assignment Regulations, ch. VII, arts. 44-45, translated in WAN ET AL., supra, at 2105.
32. Comments by second- and third-year L.L.M. students in the author's classes on "The
Law of Real Estate" at East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, China
(Spring Semester 2002).
33. Id.
34. See RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 99 (noting the uncertainty of whether
mortgage lenders will really be permitted to foreclose on residential mortgages and evict
defaulting residents).
EXAMPLES FROM CHINA
While enhancing land tenure security35 may permit a market to
develop for an emerging nation's mortgage-backed debt in the
world's securities markets, unless the risks to an emerging nation's
untested property rights can be identified and limited, the benefits
of such a market, including credit enhancement, foreign commer-
cial investment, and capital for mortgage loans, will be slowed. A
necessary next course, therefore, is to expose the myriad sources of
risk to land tenure security and then implement means by which
they may be reduced.
II. IDENTIFYING RISKS TO OWNERS' LAND TENURE SECURITY AND
INVESTORS' SECURITY INTERESTS IN LAND
Economists who first concluded that land tenure security would
stimulate economic growth equated the legal grant and public
registration of private land titles with land tenure security.
Subsequent studies have shown, however, that legalizing private
occupants' title to land and establishing formal land title registra-
tion systems do not always provide access to capital or stimulate a
market economy.36 These studies reveal that loans will not be
available even to titled landowners if the location, size, and value of
35. Many nations, including China, will find it necessary to amend mortgage assignment
and securities laws to permit securitization of pools of mortgage loans.
36.
Empirical studies done in some rural areas of Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda and
Somalia on the economic effects of land registration have found no statistically
significant links between land registration on the one hand and investment and
land productivity on the other.... [Tihe expected benefits of land registration did
not materialize in the studies of Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda and Somalia.
BYAMUGISHA, supra note 18, at 1, 6 (citations omitted).
Studies show that in Honduras, four years after registration, there was no difference in the
rate of land transactions in one titled area compared to the rate of transactions in untitled
areas. In fact, landowners transferred fewer parcels of land in one titled area during a four-
year period than in the untitled area. The landowners themselves, however, perceived
economic benefits from titling. Perhaps because having title enhanced the owners' interest
in utilizing their land and developing it, they simply became less interested in transferring
it for value. Hanstad, supra note 12, at 660, 661 n.47. For further evidence, see BUILDING
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS, supra note 1, at 7-9; Alan Gilbert, On the Mystery of Capital and
the Myths of Hernando De Soto: What Difference Does Legal Title Make?, 24 INTrL DEV. PLAN.
REV. 11 (2002) (commenting on studies in Colombia, Turkey, Mexico, and South Africa);
Baharoglu, supra note 1, at 18, 24-29.
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the parcels involved are inadequate to interest lenders.37 Studies
also show borrowers cannot obtain loans if they cannot promise that
they will have regular income to repay loans.3"
Additionally, formal land title registration systems cannot always
reduce risks to private land titles sufficiently to motivate commer-
cial lenders and foreign investors. Hidden risks to land tenure
security need to be exposed. This Part will show how legal scholars
can advise lawmakers to reduce (a) risks created by ambiguities,
high transactions costs, and failures of process in the property
rights institution itself, and (b) conflicts between the goals of a
nation's new property rights institution and goals of its other
institutions and local norms. This Part will provide examples of
legal scholars' identification of such risks in China and lawmakers'
subsequent successes in reducing those impediments to economic
growth.
A. Risks Within a Nation's Property Rights Institution
It is not necessary that a nation grant private ownership rights
equal to the common law fee simple absolute recognized in the
United States to create land tenure security and economic growth.
A private right for a definite term to possess, use, manage, receive
income from, and transfer interests in a parcel of land has market
value for purposes of credit, foreign commercial investment, and
securitizing mortgage loans, so long as those rights are clear,
enforceable, and indefeasible, even if the sovereign or the State
retains the fee title.39 If rights are not clear, enforced by law, and
indefeasible, however, investment in land will not be encouraged.
Risks to land tenure security can exist within a nation's property
rights institution itself. Common sources of risks to owners' land
tenure and investors' expectations that arise from the very rules,
37. Baharoglu, supra note 1, at 18.
38. Id.
39. The market for land use rights in China illustrates the truth of this assertion. See also
KLAUS DEININGER & GERSHON FEDER, LAND INSTITUTIONS AND LAND MAREETS 10 (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2014, 1998), available at http-J/www-
wds.worldbank.org (concluding that land tenure can be usufruct and does not have to be full
ownership, if it is sufficiently secure).
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enforcement mechanisms, and organizations intended to establish
private property rights include:
" characteristics of a nation's property rights institution that
impose high transactions costs on the attaining of formal
property rights;
" ambiguities in legal limitations on persons and entities
authorized to acquire, hold, and transfer land rights, including,
but not exclusive of, limitations on governmental subdivisions,
women, minors, and mental incompetents;
* ambiguities in limits on the alienability of land and security
interests in land;
* vague or inaccurate land description and boundary systems;
* lack of a legal right entitling owners to their land;
• rights of use and rights to restrict use accorded to occupants of
adjacent land;
* land use regulations that are inaccessible or that fail to define
means of compliance, including environmental, development,
subdivision, zoning, and construction regulations;
* property tax laws, transfer taxes, assessments for public works,
utilities' liens, and lien foreclosure procedures;
* errors by not satisfying formalities required for transfers of
land that permit a transfer to be challenged;
* failures of process in official, ministerial, or judicial transfers
of private property-including in an owner's death or divorce,
a guardianship proceeding, or a foreclosure or judicial sale on
execution of debt-that create a risk of avoidance of the
transfer;
* a land registry that is inaccessible, incomplete, inconsistent
and inaccurate due to
o delays in registering titles by grantees or registry officials,
o high fees that discourage use of the registry,
o conflicting titles and interloping conveyances,
o failure to give notice to interested parties when registering
titles, or
o recognition of unregistered conflicting interests by the
judiciary;
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" legal interests created by operation of law that "override" the
registry;
" uncertainty as to the effect of failure to comply with laws and
regulations of the property rights institution, for example,
whether the consequence of failure to comply with formalities
or restrictions will be a mere requirement to comply, a fine, or
a forfeiture of the property interest; and
" lack of an efficient process for resolving land title disputes.4 °
When legal scholars help development specialists and legislators
recognize risks within the property rights institution that may deter
investment, action to reduce these risks can be implemented and
land tenure security stabilized.4 For example, as part of the
government's goal of establishing market transactions," China
amended its Constitution and Land Administration Law in 1988 to
permit the transfer of "land use rights" to private persons.43 In
keeping with national philosophy, the right of full ownership of the
land remains vested in either the State or an agricultural collective,
but land use rights may be granted to private persons or entities for
specific terms, typically between thirty and seventy years. In
general, holders of granted land use rights may sell, lease, mortgage
or otherwise transfer these rights." Legal scholars subsequently
have identified ambiguities and uncertainties within the new laws,
enforcement mechanisms, and organizations composing China's
property rights institution. Legal scholars then worked with
lawmakers to propose clarifications, primarily via a new "Property
40. The examples listed are the sort of title risks that title examiners search for, attorneys
write title opinions concerning, and title insurance policies are purchased to indemnify
against in the United States. See generally the author's two leading treatises on land title
issues, law, and insurance: JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES (3d ed.
2003); JOYCE PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE LAW (1994).
41. See infra Conclusion (regarding reducing risks to land tenure security).
42. "The state has put into practice a socialist market economy." XIANFA [Constitution]
amend. II, 7 (1993), translated in WANETAL., supra note 31, at 103. "Individual, private and
other non-public economies that exist within the limits prescribed by law are major
components of the socialist market economy." Id. amend. III.
43. See supra note 31.
44. Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 2, § 1, art. 7 (adopted July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995),
translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2066-72.
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Code" that will be added to the Civil Code of China.41 Some exam-
ples of their efforts follow.
Example 1: Land Use Renewal Rights. One uncertainty involves
a land use rights holder's ability to renew at the end of the term.
Holders of granted land use rights may apply for renewal at least
one year prior to the expiration of the term. 6 The current Real
Estate Administration Law provides that the Chinese government
will approve a renewal application unless the State needs to recover
the land for the public interest v.4  No one really knows how much
protection this "renewal right" gives to holders of granted land use
rights, because none of the land use rights granted after the 1988
Constitutional amendment have entered the renewal period.48
Additionally, existing law does not state whether the land use
rights holder must pay new consideration based on the value of the
land at the time of renewal, or whether the renewed term will be at
least as long as the original term. Legal scholars advised develop-
ment specialists and lawmakers that long-term investment could be
hindered and improvements permitted to deteriorate as the end of
45. Legislation affecting property rights in China to date has been addressed through the
country's constitution, civil code, commercial code, and in land administration regulations and
rules. In 1999, Chinese scholars began to draft a comprehensive property law code. The
purposes were to enhance further property rights, land finance, environmental protection, and
agricultural production institutions and to reduce risks to purchasers, lenders and investors
in land that had been recognized. The draft of the new Property Code that scholars are
expected to propose to the National People's Congress would both reinforce existing laws and
add laws on land rights that have been absent until now. Some examples are laws governing
communities structured similarly to condominiums in the United States, and laws governing
leases and transfers of a family's tenure rights in land within an agricultural collective.
Chinese legal scholars have sought suggestions from other nations' real property law
scholars regarding laws, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms that best sustain a market
economy, particularly those pertaining to land use, possession, transfer, development, and
financing that scholars believe stimulated and sustained economic growth in the West. The
author was one of the scholars invited in 2000 to comment at a Peking University Law School
Forum on property laws to stimulate a market economy. The author also was invited in 2001
to comment at a Tsinghua University Law School Forum led by Professor Jiang Ping on the
draft of the Property Code that is to be submitted to the National People's Congress.
46. Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 2, art. 21, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at
2063. Local regulations are permitted to alter that requirement, however. See RANDOLPH &
Lou, supra note 31, at 128.
47. Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 2, art. 21, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at
2063.
48. See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 31, at 128; Palomar, supra note 4, at 33; Comments
by Prof. Patrick A Randolph & Prof. Lou Jianbo for the Sino-American Forum on Chinese
Property Law, Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, China, June 17-18, 2002 (article on file with author).
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the term nears because of uncertainty about the holder's ability to
renew. This would decrease both market value of the property and
loan value of the land use right near the end of its term. To reduce
the uncertainty and risk, Chinese scholars recommended an article
in the proposed new Property Code to confirm expressly that the
government shall renew a land use right, and that renewal is a
"right" that the State will acknowledge, unless it is necessary to
reclaim the land in the public interest. 9 This amendment and its
intent approaches the concept of eminent domain in the United
States and Great Britain, where the state's reclamation of property
is a sufficiently rare risk that does not impede credit for the
development of land. °
Example 2: Forfeiture of Land Use Rights if Purpose of Grant Is
Not Commenced or Continued. A second example of a risk to land
tenure security within China's property rights institution is existing
law providing for forfeiture of a granted land use right if the use
for which it was granted is not commenced or continued. The State
grants land use rights for specified purposes. 1 The purpose may be
broad, such as residential use, or the purpose may be specific, such
as building and operating a factory. If the purpose for which a land
use right was granted is not properly commenced within two years,
it is forfeitable to the state.52 No compensation is "payable either for
49. See Property Law of the People's Republic of China, ch. 14, art. 66 (June 2003) (draft
for comments presented by Prof. Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students, and
on file with author). In addition, this statute provides that
[ilf the holder of the land-use right for construction wants to use the land
continuously after the term expires, he shall apply for prolongation of time in
advance of one year. Transferor shall agree except it is necessary to reclaim the
land for the sake of social public interest.
Id.
50. Legal scholars have recommended a further amendment to the proposed article to
clarify what renewal term an owner can expect and the cost for renewal of the land use right.
See Comments by Prof Patrick A Randolph & Prof Lou Jianbo, supra note 48.
51. Although the State transfers granted land use rights for a fee to individuals and
entities for residential or commercial use, the State can also give allocated land use rights
without charge to educational institutions, cultural organizations, health institutions,
scientific research institutes, and political subdivisions to use only for their particular
purposes. See Palomar, supra note 4, at 43. "Recent amendments to the law have created
uncertainty regarding whether an allocated land use right automatically terminates if the
land use is discontinued." Id. Also, allocated land use rights are not transferable. Id. at 40.
For a discussion of issues and risks when the holder of an allocated land use right does lease
or transfer to another, see id. at 38-42.
52. See Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 2, § 1, art. 7, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31,
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the loss of the land use right or the improvements." 3 Conversely, so
long as the granted land use right was properly commenced, it does
not appear to be forfeitable if the use is not continued. 4
To satisfy the national objectives of development and economic
growth that support granting private land use rights, commence-
ment of land use usually requires substantial construction." Local
governmental regulations may provide other definitions of what
constitutes commencement.5 6 For example, local regulations in
Shenzhen provide that "'commencement' requires that all develop-
ment and land use permits be obtained, and twenty-five percent of
the planned investment be expended for the project."" In the
majority of locales where no specific definition of commencement
exists, the government may disagree with investors' judgment that
the use was properly commenced or continued, and then will reclaim
the land, thereby chilling such investment for current and future
projects. The law does permit certain excuses for failure to com-
mence use within the two-year period, including force majeure,
government interference with commencement, and other justifiable
excuses.5 8 Again, however, investors and the government may reach
different conclusions regarding the cause of a failure to commence
the use.
In addition to permitting forfeiture, China's existing law invali-
dates any transfer of a granted land use right if the purpose for
which the land use right was granted to the transferor is not
substantially completed before the transfer.5 9 Several localities have
adopted similar regulations to encourage land development and
discourage acquisition of land use rights for purposes of speculation
at 2067; RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 130.
53. RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 130. Also, "[dielay of commencement even for one
year can result in a fine of up to 20% of the fee paid for the land use right," as well as other
legal consequences. Id.
54. Id. In contrast, allocated land use rights may be forfeited if the use is not continued.
Id. at 131.
55. Id. at 130.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 2, § 1, art. 7, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31,
at 2065.
59. RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 131.
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and personal profit making.6 0 Preconditions to the transfer of a
granted land use right include:
(1) The grantee must have paid the land use right fee and
obtained the land use right certificate;
(2) The grantee must have commenced the development of the
land in accordance with the granting contract. In building
projects, this means that the grantee must have invested
at least twenty-five percent of the whole projected invest-
ment; and
(3) If the building construction has finished, the grantee must
have obtained the building ownership certificate. For the
sale of housing to foreigners, a permit must have been
obtained from the government."
A risk of invalidation occurs if the land use rights holder, a
purchaser, and the purchaser's lender all deem the legal precondi-
tions to have been substantially met, but, after the transfer, the
State determines that the preconditions were not satisfied.
The Property Code that legal scholars are recommending to
China's National People's Congress would eliminate these fearsome
risks of forfeiture and invalid transfer. Article 32 of the proposed
Property Code would change the current law so that a land use right
is not actually granted until the State determines that the specified
purpose has commenced sufficiently. Requiring this condition to be
met before the land use right is acquired should also better motivate
grantees to accomplish the purpose for the grant. In contrast, the
existing Land Administration Bureau's (LAB) rules grant a land use
right, but make it subject to subsequent forfeiture if the purpose for
which the land was granted is not accomplished.62
Example 3: Rights of Use and Rights to Restrict Use. Currently,
Chinese law does not expressly recognize the concept of easements. 3
In addition, China's land title registration law lacks provisions for
60. Id.
61. See Urban Real Estate Law, pt. III, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2068.
For subdivisions, the developer must have installed the infrastructure. RANDOLPH & LOu,
supra note 31, at 183.
62. RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 31, at 130.
63. Id. at 322.
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registering easements.64 If a contract for the transfer of a land use
right contains promises in the nature of easements, this contract
would become part of the registration file for the land use right.6"
Significantly, such promises are not likely to appear on the official
registration card.' Legal scholars have advised that a risk for both
investors in the burdened land and the benefitted land is uncer-
tainty as to whether such a right would bind successive owners of
the burdened land.67
Chinese law also does not expressly recognize or permit registra-
tion of covenants that create a duty of use or a restriction on the use
of a parcel of land.68 If such covenants in transfer documents are
treated as mere contracts, they will not bind successors to the
burdened land use right.69 Legal scholars warn that this creates a
risk that transferees of housing or office units in condominium-style
developments will not be bound by the initial transferee's covenants
relating to use or maintenance fees.7" Even with no notice from their
own purchase contracts or the land registry, purchasers, lessees,
lenders, and investors risk government enforcement of restrictive
covenants in documents that created the development if the
restrictions are deemed necessary for the operation of the develop-
ment.71
To reduce these risks, Chinese legal scholars have proposed
Chapter 16, Article 182 of the new Property Code expressly to
authorize creation and registration of servitudes and to prevent
enforcement of unregistered servitudes against third parties.72 In
addition, Article 189 would clarify that a written and registered
servitude will bind a transferee of the servient land use right.73
64. Id. at 323.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.; see also Palomar, supra note 4, at 36.
68. RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 323-24.
69. Id. at 324.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Specifically, a "[slervitude is acquired when contract of servitude comes into force.
Holder of servitude shall apply to registration authorities for registration if the parties so
request. No servitude can act against a third party unless registered." Property Law of
People's Republic of China, ch. 16, art. 182 (June 2003) (draft for comments presented by
Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students, and on file with author).
73. Id. at ch. 16, art. 189.
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Chapter 16 of the proposed Property Code also would answer
questions about a servitude's effect on the servient tenement
holder's ability to vary the use of the land, and would designate acts
that can terminate a servitude. 4
Currently, China does recognize unwritten and unregistered
rights of use by adjacent landowners.75 When one party needs to
cross over or through another's property for water, drainage,
ventilation, utility services, light, or access to the first party's
property, Chinese law recognizes and protects the right to use land
in this manner as a "neighborhood right."76 The policy of China's
property rights institution in enforcing such rights is to maintain:
"proper neighborly relations in the spirit of helping production,
making things convenient for people's lives, enhancing unity and
mutual assistance, and being fair and reasonable."77 When neighbor-
hood rights arise as a matter of law, rather than by contract or
conveyance, there is nothing to register in the land registry. Legal
scholars noted that such rights create risks that purchasers and
lenders cannot know of, bargain about, or otherwise mitigate. To
better inform investors, Chinese legal scholars have drafted a
section of the proposed Property Code to clarify the law on neighbor-
hood rights." The proposed code also would reduce purchasers' and
74. Id.
75. RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 316.
76. Id. The party benefitting from the neighborhood right may have a duty to compensate
for injury or inconvenience. See id. at 318. Neighborhood rights are roughly equivalent to
American common law easements by necessity. Id. at 47.
77. Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 9, art. 77 (June 2003) (draft for
comments presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students, and
on file with author).
78. Chapter Nine takes several steps towards clarifying the law of neighborhood rights.
Specifically, the "[hlolder of immovables shall provide convenience for neighboring holders
over use of water and drainage." Id. at ch. 9, art. 78. In addition, the
[hiolder of immovables is entitled to prohibit others' intrusion into his land,
except under either of the following situations:
(1) It is necessary for neighboring holder to use the land for passage;
(2) It is necessary for neighboring holder to use the land for construction,
repairing building and its accessory facilities;
(3) It is necessary to use this land in accordance with local customs.
Id. at ch. 9, art. 81. Another section provides that "[p]roper distance shall be kept between
neighboring buildings and altitude of each building shall be limited. One building shall not
hinder ventilation, lighting and sunshine of the other buildings." Id. at ch. 9, art. 82. If"it is
necessary for holder of immovables to use neighboring land to install wires, electric cables,
water pipes, gas pipes and other pipes, the holder of neighboring land shall provide necessary
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lenders' risk by giving a land use rights holder a right to compensa-
tion for any damage caused by persons exercising neighborhood
rights for access, water use, drainage, or laying pipes and wires.7"
Example 4: Rights of Unit Owners in Buildings. China's property
rights institution recognizes co-ownership by shares.80 A concern
identified by legal scholars, however, is the inability under that
concept to determine the exact nature of the rights of persons who
purchase land use rights in units of housing or office complexes
that are developed similarly to American condominiums."' Although
it has been clear that occupants own the space within their own
units and have neighborhood rights against the rest of the build-
ing, a number of questions remain open: 2 Do owners of units hold
fractional ownership interests in the common areas?' Do owners
of units have any rights or obligations regarding the building's
appearance or maintenance? Does such co-ownership bring with it
liability for injuries in common areas or for costs of maintaining
common areas? When an owner sells a unit, does the owner's con-
tractual agreement to pay maintenance fees run with the property
to the purchaser of the unit? Do owners of units have the preemp-
tive right that Chinese law generally gives to co-owners by shares
to purchase the share of any co-owner who wishes to sell? 4
As a result of these uncertainties, the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress has drafted completely new law on
separate ownership in buildings in the proposed Property Code.8"
These proposed statutes would specify that unit owners "enjoy joint
ownership of corridors, elevators and otherjoint parts, and enjoy the
convenience." Id. at ch. 9, art. 83. In addition, the "[h]older of immovables is entitled to
prohibit neighboring holders from discharging and divulging atmospheric pollutants and
giving out of noise shake, light, wireless radio and other virulent matters." Id. at ch. 9, art.
84. Further, "[d]isinterring of land, constructing building, installing pipes and wires and
installment by the holder of immovables should not damage the ordinary use and safety of
neighboring immovables." Id. at ch. 9, art. 85.
79. Id. at ch. 9, art. 86.
80. RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 45.
81. Id. at 47.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 47-48.
85. Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 9, art. 86 (June 2003) (draft for
comments presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translation by Tsinghua Univ. law students,
and on file with author).
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right of joint management of maintaining the buildings and ac-
cessory facilities."" In addition, the statutes would clarify that the
unit owners, as joint owners, must bear costs of maintenance
and repairs both for their units and the common areas,87 and that
if owners sell their units, their rights to common areas will be
transferred as well." Finally, the proposed statutes specify that an
association composed of all the separate owners will be the manage-
ment organ of the buildings and accessory facilities, rather than
the developer.89 Other proposed articles provide for unit owners to
vote on decisions of the association and set the percentage vote
required for actions that substantially impact individual unit
owners' property rights." While legal scholars continue to recom-
mend additional clarifications,91 the proposed property law goes a
long way toward reducing the risk of loss of unit purchasers'
expectations. As a result, it also reduces the risk of unit purchasers
defaulting on their purchase money mortgage loans.
Example 5: Land Title Registration Risks. Risks to owners'
property rights and lenders' security interests can exist within the
processes for registering and transferring private rights in land.
Risks can be a consequence of incomplete, inaccurate, inefficient,
and uneconomical land title registration procedures;92 vague land
description and boundary systems;93 conflicting titles and interlop-
ing conveyances;94 lack of an efficient process for resolving land
boundary disputes;95 and interests created by operation of law
that override the registry.' Risks also exist when applicable land
administration regulations, including development, subdivision,
building and construction, land use, zoning, and environmental
regulations, are not apparent from the registry.97 Additional risks
arise from ambiguous or unevenly applied property tax laws,
86. Id. at ch. 9, art. 66.
87. Id. at ch. 9, art. 69.
88. Id. at ch. 9, art. 68.
89. Id. at ch. 9, art. 70.
90. See generally id. at ch. 9.
91. See Comments by Prof. Patrick A Randolph & Prof Lou Jianbo, supra note 48.
92. RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 166.
93. Id. at 173.
94. Palomar, supra note 4, at 20-21.
95. Id. at 24.
96. Id. at 25.
97. Id.
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assessments for public works, utility liens, and lien foreclosure
procedures.9" Furthermore, lack of a fixed process or rules for dis-
puting land administration decisions increases transactions costs
and discourages investment.
Most developed countries utilize registries of rights.99 In contrast
to America's system of merely recording title evidence, a registry of
rights is intended to do more than give notice. A registry of rights
intends to establish conclusively the rights to each parcel of land.' °
A right in rem is not created until the registrar determines the
status of title and enters it in the land registry.'0 ' With a few
exceptions, rights not reflected in the register are not recognized,
even if legitimate. 12 Properly functioning registries of rights reduce
risks to purchasers, lenders and other investors significantly more
than the system of public title evidence recording provided by local
governments in the United States. To this end, most developed
countries have invested significant government dollars to train
registry officials, survey parcels, and provide judicial or administra-
tive proceedings for the conclusive determination and registration
of title to each parcel of land. At the recommendation of economists
and land administration experts, in recent decades, emerging
economies have attempted to adopt such registries of rights.0" Their
successes have varied, however, and often in different localities
within the same nation. The problem often is the cost of maintain-
ing such a system. When the cost of a formal registry of rights is
higher than a locality can sustain, or when other factors prevent a
98. Id. at 37-38.
99. See also PALOMAR, PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, supra note 40, § 691;
PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE LAW, supra note 40, § 22:2.
100. PALOMAR, PATRON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, supra note 40, § 691.
101. The land registry both states the identity of the legal titleholder and lists all
easements, liens, mortgages, leases, covenants, and other encumbrances against the title.
Schwarzwalder, supra note 20, at 167. An owner who transfers land brings the contract or
deed to the registry and the registrar makes a new entry on the register in the name of the
new owner. Id. at 168. In systems that use certificates, the registrar issues a new certificate.
Id. The registrar maintains files or books containing the originals or copies of all documents
referred to on the land register so an examiner can review them. Id. The files or books are
usually indexed by tract of land, permitting easy location of all instruments affecting title to
that tract. Id. Nevertheless, a prospective purchaser or lender wanting to learn the status of
rights to a tract of land only needs to inspect the current land register itself. Id. at 167.
102. Canadian and English attorneys have told the author that this is truer in theory than
in fact, and that their courts recognize many exceptions in the interest of fairness and equity.
103. See citations throughout supra Part I.
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formal land title registry from functioning properly, risks are
created, rather than reduced.
Like many emerging nations, China has adopted a registry of
rights system. 4 Because the institution of private property rights
in land is still relatively new in China, Chinese legal scholars are
still debating its foundational principles. 5 A recent debate centers
on when a right in rem is created legally. At least one Chinese legal
scholar argued that the right in rem should be deemed created in a
transferee through the contract of sale, and that registering should
only perfect the transferee's interest and give notice to third
parties.1 06 This is essentially the theory of the private property
104. The registration process includes: (1) a land registration application form; (2) registry
officials obtaining a survey of the land; (3) registry officials examining the title to the land and
adjudicating or mediating competing claims; (4) completion of a land registration card for each
legal person with an interest in the land and placement of it in the land registration book; and
(5) issuance of a land title certificate to the applicant. See Rules on Land Registration, ch. II,
arts. 10-19 (1995), translated in WAN ETAL., supra note 31, at 2124-26; RANDOLPH & LOU,
supra note 31, at 164. Subsequently, a new registration is made when a registered land use
right is transferred, when any changes are made to the name of the land user, or when a
previous land registration is cancelled. Rules on Land Registration, chs. IV-V, translated in
WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2129-33. If an applicant claims to have lost a land use rights
certificate, then public notice and a comment period will be given before issuance of a new
certificate. RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 165. The LAB is responsible for settling
disputes over land use rights by mediating disputes and registering the results. See Land Law
Implementing Rules, ch. 2, art. 16 (1998), translated in WANETAL., supra note 31, at 2145-46;
Rules on Land Registration, ch. II, art. 18, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2126.
Further, China is among those countries in which the registry office is financially responsible
for the direct economic consequences caused by its negligent registration of an interest.
RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 171. These do not include the owner's "expectation
damages," even those regarded as 'reasonably foreseeable.'" Id.
At least theoretically, the local LAB's book of land registration cards should be indexed by
tract of land. Rules on Land Registration, ch. VII, art. 60, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note
31, at 2135. Each LAB office should file: the land registration application forms received; the
documents submitted as evidence of legal rights in the land with each registration application;
the land registration approval form; the land registration book composed of all the land
registration cards; receipts for land use rights certificates; and any other agreements or
documents made for deciding titles to land. Rules on Land Registration, ch. VII, art. 59,
translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2135. Chinese law also provides for a national
cadaster for purposes of taxation and land use planning.
105. The author heard such debate among Chinese scholars who participated in the Sino-
American forum on Chinese Property Law, Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, China, June 17-18, 2002
(conference papers on file with author). Similar debate occurred at the Conference on The
Rule of Law in Real Estate in China, Beijing Univ., June 16, 2001 (conference papers on file
with author).
106. The author heard this argument by one Chinese scholar at the Sino-American Forum
on Chinese Property Law, Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, China, June 17-18, 2002 (conference
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rights institution and title evidence recording system in America;
in contrast, other scholars point out that the quintessential char-
acteristic of a registry of rights is that rights in rem cannot be
created other than through registration. Under this latter theory, a
party with an unregistered claim to land may have a right in
contract for money damages, but no right in rem to be awarded the
land over the titleholder listed in the registry of rights. It is this
theory that allows a registry of rights to be conclusive and provide
greater land tenure security than the American system of recording
title evidence.
The proposed Property Code would end the uncertainty regard-
ing the legal effect of registration and clarify that China's property
rights institution honors registration as the act that creates a
transferee's land use right."0° The proposed code clarifies further
that certificates of title given by registrars to transferees are merely
evidence of their title and that, if the contents of a certificate of title
are inconsistent with the registry, the transferee's legal rights shall
be based on the registry."8
China's land registries in business centers such as Beijing and
Shanghai reportedly are operating efficiently and accurately.
Current LAB rules and procedures reflect the components that
experts have recommended. China's urban business centers also are
reported to be doing well with the timeliness of registration. Users
of the Beijing and Shanghai registries have told the author that the
time between filing an application to register a transfer of a land
use right and its actual registration is six to eight months."co Legal
papers on file with author).
107. Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 2, art. 15 (June 2003) (draft for
comments, presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students,
and on file with author).
108. Id. at ch. 2, art. 14.
109. Interview with Jin Jinping, Attorney and Lecturer, Peking University (Jan. 10, 2003).
This amount of time from application to transfer is no more than required by Germany's
exemplary Grundbach system. John Blythe, Report in Telephone Conference of the
International Title Assurance Subcommittee of the Title Insurance Committee of the
American College of Real Estate Lawyers (Jan. 14, 2003).
In contrast, mortgage registration procedures in Mexico can take up to four years. Shahir
Guindi, Legal and Regulatory Considerations for Residential Mortgage Backed Securitization
in Mexico, in LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED
SECURITIZATION IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 5 (World Bank Urban & Local Gov't Div. ed.,
2000), available at http'//www-wds.worldbank.org. In further contrast,
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scholars have found, however, that in some less urban locations in
China, the organization of the land registry records renders them
inaccessible in fact.110 Reportedly, public inspection has not been
permitted in some locations, despite the recent legal mandate."'
The charging of high fees for access to registry records also has
inhibited use of the land registry in some locations." 2 The risk of
proceeding with planning, financing, and purchase is great if a
transferee cannot know that the title is as the transferor repre-
sents it until after closing the transaction and having the trans-
feree's own application for land use rights registration accepted
or declined." 3 To reduce that risk, China's Ministry of Land and
Resources adopted a new law, effective March 2003, declaring that
In Mozambique there is a backlog of about 10,000 applications for land rights,
which means long delays between receipt of an investment plan and eventual
granting of the land right. In Cameroon, the minimum amount of time it takes
to register a plot is 15 months, and registration commonly takes between 2 and
7 years. In Peru the official adjudication process takes 43 months and 207 steps
in 48 offices, although an expedited process has been implemented in selected
areas.
BUILDING INsTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS, supra note 1, at 35.
110. RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 31, at 166.
111. In 1996, the Rules on Land Registration changed the preexisting policy of open public
inspection. See id. These Rules required parties wishing to inspect the registration records,
including potential transferees and mortgagees, to apply for permission in writing. See id. at
165-66; see also Clarke & Howson, supra note 31, at 15. The 1998 Land Law Implementing
Rules restated the previously existing policy that records should be available for public
inspection. See Land Law Implementing Rules (1998), translated in WAN ET AL., supra note
31, at 2084. Yet, it was not clear whether permission will always be granted, particularly to
foreigners, or whether the times permitted for inspection will be reasonable. "[R]egular and
effective access to the registration records may not be a practical reality in some areas unless
the party seeking such access has [a connection]." RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 166;
see also Andrew John Godwin, The Theory Underpinning the Development of Mortgage Law
in China 121-22 (2000) (unpublished Master of Laws thesis, University of Melbourne) (on file
with the University of Melbourne Library) (arguing that Article 45 of the Peoples' Republic
of China Security Law providing for inspections of the registration department is more theory
than practice and that it is often difficult even for lawyers to inspect the registry).
112. RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 31, at 166.
113. "If access is limited, the long-term integrity of the land registry system may be
threatened. Moreover, the registry's usefulness as a source of land market information
remains unmet if public access is limited." Schwarzwalder, supra note 20, at 175 (discussing
public access to land registration records in Eastern European countries).
If both the registry book and copies of right-establishing documents are open to public
inspection, purchasers, lenders and other investors also can be more confident in the accuracy
of the registry's conclusions as to the proper holder of title and less worried about corruption
or political favoritism.
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registries must be open for public inquiry.114 Chapter Two of the new
Property Code proposed by Chinese legal scholars would mandate
further that registries must be open for inspection,"15 registration
fees must be "moderate," and all matters must be registered in a
timely manner."'
Additionally, legal scholars identified conflicts within the prop-
erty rights institution itself involving China's dual land registry
system-one system and location for land use rights registration
and a separate system and location for building ownership and
lease registration." 7 A title risk exists if an owner registers
ownership of a building, but fails to register simultaneously an
ownership interest in the land use right to the land under and
around the building."8 Legal scholars recommended that for
efficiency, consistency, and accuracy in both registration of transfers
and examination of title, these systems should be consolidated." 9
The 1994 Law on Urban Real Estate Administration authorized
provincial governments to consolidate the registration systems
114. Measure for Public Enquiry to Land Registration Data, No. 14, Ministry of Land and
Resources of PRC Order (promulgated Dec. 4, 2002, effective March 1, 2003); E-mail from Li
Hao, Tsinghua University Law School Ph.D. student, to Professor Joyce Palomar (July 20,
2003).
115. Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 2, art. 13 (June 2003) (draft for
comments, presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tshinghua Univ. law students,
and on file with author).
116. Id. at ch. 2, art. 11.
117. Under the current system, Land Administration Bureaus "at or above the county
level" are in charge of the registration of land use rights. Land Law, ch. 2, art. 11, (amended
1998), translated in WAN ETAL., supra note 31, at 2044; Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 5, art.
60 (adopted July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at
2073; Rules on Land Registration, ch. 1, arts. 4, 7 (1995), translated in WAN ETAL., supra note
31, at 2122-23.
A second system exists for the registration of interests in buildings, including ownership,
leasehold interests, mortgages and other security interests. Procedures for the Administration
of the Leasing of Premises in Urban Areas, Decree No. 43, Peoples' Republic Ministry of
Construction, pt. III (May 9, 1995), translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2160-61;
RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 168-71. "The building administrations at or above the
county level are in charge of registration and certificate issuance for ownership of buildings
and other interests in buildings." Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 4, art. 31, & ch. 5, art. 60,
translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2066, 2073; RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 31, at
163.
118. RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 31, at 170.
119. Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 5, art. 60, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at
2073.
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within their own jurisdictions. 2 ° As a result, regulations were
passed in Shanghai and Shenzhen to provide for one government
agency, the Municipal Building and Land Bureau, to issue a
uniform certificate for both interests. 1"' In 2003, Chinese legal
scholars began drafting a set of registration regulations for Beijing
that would accomplish the same. 22 Legal scholars have recom-
mended that further consolidation of the two registry systems
throughout the country can reduce inconsistencies, confusion, time
and expense in both registration and examination of rights to land
and buildings.'23
One more illustration of risk to land tenure rights within China's
property rights identified by legal scholars is that land descriptions
often utilize impermanent monuments such as local roads, build-
ings, or other features as beginning points for descriptions of the
land. 24 When land descriptions are inadequate, interests in the
same land could be registered under different land descriptions and,
consequently, purchasers and other investors may not be able to
rely on the land registry. If a transfer or mortgage was registered
under one land description, it is unclear whether it would defeat
a subsequent registration of a transfer or mortgage filed under
another, more accurate description of the same land. Some legal
experts recommended recognizing a concept like adverse posses-
sion to make the boundaries of parcels of land as occupied their
actual, legal boundaries. 2 ' Though Chinese law does not generally
recognize the concept of adverse possession, 26 a few recent statutes
120. Id., translated in WAN ETAL., supra note 31, at 2074.
121. RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 31, at 163.
122. Verbal report to the author from Li Hao, Tsinghua University Law School Ph.D.
student and research assistant to Professor Cui Jianyuan. Both Professor Cui Jianyuan and
Li Hao are working on a draft of Beijing Land Registration Rules which they anticipate to be
similar to the Shanghai Land Registration Rules that were adopted in December 2002.
123. Palomar, supra note 4, at 60; see also RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 166.
124. RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 173.
125. See generally id. at 174 (noting that 'Chinese law does not have the concept of adverse
possession in a form as developed as the common law"); Williamson, supra note 8, at 12. The
different practices of describing land parcels for registration purposes in different countries
are discussed in Hanstad, supra note 13, at 677. See also Schwarzwalder, supra note 20, at
177 (describing the "Draft Registration Law" of the Kyrgyz Republic as having a low initial
standard for land descriptions, but containing procedures for adding more detailed
descriptions where necessary). Either the registry office or the holder of rights can ask for a
topographic survey of boundaries if they deem it necessary. Id.
126. RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 31, at 174.
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have begun to permit possession to be used to resolve boundary
disputes and clarify registration records.'27
Finally, legal scholars have identified the absence of clear
methods to decide boundary and title disputes as a risk to land
tenure rights within China's property rights institution. 28 Chinese
legal scholars advocate resolving this risk in the proposed new
Property Code for China by implicitly empowering registration
authorities to hear boundary disputes and make corrections. 29 This
resolution is economical, efficient and reasonable, because registra-
tion authorities generally will have greater experience in land
rights, administration, and surveys than courts.
B. Conflicts Between Goals of the Property Rights Institution and
Other Institutions and Norms
Myriad institutions affect the security of land tenure and
investments in land besides a nation's property rights institution.
Claims and forfeiture of rights to land can arise from operation of
the laws, rules, enforcement mechanisms, and supporting organiza-
tions of constitutional law; administrative law; local government
law; commercial law; secured finance, mortgage and foreclosure law;
debtor, creditor, and bankruptcy law; civil procedure; contract law;
business associations, corporate, agency, and partnership law;
environmental, natural resources, and water law; tax law; family
law; inheritance and succession law; and criminal law. This Section
will illustrate the ways that legal scholars have assisted an
emerging economy's economic development goals by identifying
conflicts between the goals of its property rights institution and
certain laws, rules, and enforcement mechanisms of the nation's
other institutions.
127. Id.
128. Palomar, supra note 4, at 24-25; Joyce Palomar, Comments on the Draft Property Law
of People's Republic of China at the Sino-American Forum on Chinese Property Law,
Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, China, June 17-18, 2002 (commenting on Article 18); Comments by
Prof. Patrick A Randolph & Prof. Lou Jianbo, supra note 48 (commenting on Article 18).
129. Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 2, arts. 11 & 18 (June 2003) (draft for
comments presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students, and
on file with author).
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1. Risks Within a Nation's Financing and Credit Institutions
Within a nation's financing and credit institutions, risks to
owners' and lenders' rights and investors' expectations may arise as
a consequence of debtors' or creditors' rights in bankruptcy;
invalidity of conveyances by an insolvent debtor; vacated sales in
execution of debt; and rights of mechanics or material suppliers.
Further risks to a lender's lien against land may exist due to
invalidity of an assignment of the lien; invalidity of a release or
subordination of a mortgage or other lien; a prior equitable lien in
favor of the property vendor or another; inability to foreclose liens
against occupants; unenforceability of mortgage liens due to
limitations on alienability of the mortgaged property right; and
securities laws that bar securitization of mortgages. Another set of
risks to a lender's lien is a bar to its enforceability because of future
advances, interest rate changes, violations of usury or consumer
protection laws, or violations of "doing business" regulations.
Example 1: Uncertain Ability to Foreclose Mortgages on Allocated
Land Use Rights. One illustration from China's financing and credit
institutions involves legal scholars' concern regarding whether,
under China's existing "Security Law," a mortgagee would be per-
mitted to foreclose a mortgage on "allocated land use rights" on
unimproved land. While the granted land use rights discussed so far
in this Article are transferred by the State to individuals and
entities who pay market value, the State also gives allocated land
use rights without payment of value' to educational institutions,
cultural organizations, health institutions, scientific research in-
stitutes, and political subdivisions to use for their own purposes.
131
In contrast to granted land use rights which can be sold, leased,
mortgaged or otherwise transferred,12 allocated land use rights may
130. While the grantee does not pay fair market value in consideration for the transfer, a
small annual tax or "land use fee" is assessed. Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 2, § 2, art. 22
(adopted July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), translated in WAN ETAL., supra note 31, at 2064;
Allocated Land Use Rights Regulations (1992), translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at
2141; Clarke & Howson, supra note 31, at 16.
131. Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 2, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2064;
Allocated Land Use Rights Regulations, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2141;
Clarke & Howson, supra note 31, at 16.
132. Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 4 (adopted July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), translated
in WAN ETAL., supra note 31, at 2066.
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not be transferred unless the holder first receives the State's
permission to convert the allocated land use right to a granted land
use and pays value for that right.'33 Legal scholars noted that,
because allocated land use rights are nontransferable, in order to
foreclose a mortgage on an allocated land use right, the mortgagee
would be required first to pay the consideration necessary to convert
the allocated land use right to a granted land use right.
134
Additionally, legal scholars counseled that mortgagees face a risk
because conversion of an allocated land use right to a granted land
use right is at the discretion of the State, and a mortgagee has no
guarantee that the State will approve conversion for the purpose of
permitting the mortgagee to foreclose. 131 Chinese legal scholars now
propose to clarify this issue in the proposed Property Code for
China. Article 273 would affirm that the mortgagee must pay the
"granting fees for the land use right"'36 to foreclose, but also would
remove the State's discretion by declaring that the "mortgagee shall
be entitled" to have its claim satisfied with proceeds from an auction
of the allocated land use right.
137
Example 2: Inability to Register Presale Contracts as Rights In
Rem. A second illustration of a risk to purchasers' and lenders'
property rights created by conflicting goals of China's financing and
credit institutions involves preselling or preleasing the property, a
common method developers employ to obtain funds for construction.
A developer of a housing project is permitted to presell housing
before completion of construction if the developer has (1) paid the
land use right fee and obtained the land use right certificate, (2)
invested at least twenty-five percent of the entire projected invest-
133. Id.; Allocated Land Use Rights Regulations, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31;
Urban Land Grant and Assignment Regulations, ch. VII, arts. 44 & 45 (1990), translated in
WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2105.
134. RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 31, at 99, 241.
135. Id.
136. Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 23, art. 273 (June 2003) (draft for
comments presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students, and
on file with author).
Legal scholars continue to advise that, "[a]s a consequence of this provision, mortgages on
allocated land use rights likely aren't worth much." See Comments by Prof Patrick A
Randolph & Prof Lou Jianbo, supra note 48.
137. Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 23, art. 273 (June 2003) (draft for
comments presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated byTsinghua Univ. law students, and
on file with author).
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ment in the building,'38 and (3) obtained both a zoning license for
the project and a presale permit from the Building Administration
at or above the county level. Legal scholars argued, however, that
a risk to both buyers and their lenders exists because the buyer's
right under a presale contract is only a "credit right," not a land use
right that could be registered to create a right in rem in the
property. To reduce the risk of a developer reselling a parcel of
property after receiving payment from a prior unregistered buyer,
the new Property Code proposes to permit buyers to register their
presale contracts. 139 Registration of a presale contract would not
give the purchaser a right in rem, but, under the proposed Code, it
would defeat any subsequent conflicting conveyance of the property
by the developer.' ° Registration of a presale contract also should
cause the registrar to decline to register a conflicting transfer of the
property, and would give notice of the prior claim to subsequent
purchasers and lenders. Even if a subsequent purchaser were the
first to register a land use right in the property, the proposed
Property Code would leave that registry entry subject to "correction"
due to the subsequent purchaser's notice."'
Example 3: Uncertainty as to Mortgage and Foreclosure Rights on
Land in Agricultural Collectives. Recently, legal scholars found
138. Urban Real Estate Law, ch. 4, art. 38, translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at
2068. For subdivisions, the developer must have installed the infrastructure. RANDOLPH &
LOU, supra note 31, at 183.
139.
The holder of a credit right is entitled to apply to registration authorities for
advanced registration in order to restrain obligor's disposal of immovables and
ensure that the holder of the credit right acquires right in rem in the future.
After the advanced registration, Debtors' disposal of immovables in violation of
the advanced registration shall take no effect.
Comments by Prof Patrick A Randolph & Prof. Lou Jianbo, supra note 48.
140. See id. Reportedly this practice is proceeding at this time.
141. See Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 2, art. 22 (June 2003) (draft for
comments presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated byTsinghua Univ. law students, and
on file with author). "A right in rem enjoyed on the basis of the registration book of
immovables is protected by law, unless the holder recorded in the registration book of
immovables is aware of the flaws in the right in rem." Id.
Nevertheless, purchasers and their lenders still risk that the developer will not complete
the development, receive the land use right to the property, and be able to transfer a land use
right to the unit purchaser. Reducing the risk that the developer will not acquire title and the
purchaser of the presale certificate will be unable to get a final land use right is considered
in a forthcoming article by the author titled Broadening Perspectives on Land Title Assurance
Systems for Credit Enhancement in Emerging Economies.
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uncertainty as to whether land within China's agricultural collec-
tives could be mortgaged and foreclosed. That uncertainty stifled
use of agricultural land as collateral for loans for seed, fertilizer,
production costs, and improvements. While the 1988 amendments
to China's 1982 Constitution recognized a right to transfer granted
land use rights, it did not expressly address transferability of land
use rights on agricultural collective land."2 Therefore, many
believed it was not possible to lease, mortgage, or transfer owner-
ship of land in agricultural collectives."' Amendments to the Land
Administration Law in 1988 provided that land use rights on
agricultural collective land are transferable, but then the 1998
Land Administration Law appeared to prohibit such a practice.'"
Transactions of agricultural land occurred in some areas regardless
of the laws."" To enhance the availability of credit for production
and for improvements on land in agricultural collectives, the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted the
Rural Land Contracting Law, effective in March 2003, expressly
permitting farmers to transfer, lease, or mortgage their land use
right for all or any portion of its thirty-year term.'" These principles
142. RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 82.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. A 1998 Circular on Strengthening Management of Transfer of Land Use Rights and
Strictly Banning Speculative Land Dealing, issued by the General Office of the State Council,
instructed local governments to strengthen control over urban and rural land used for
nonagricultural projects and to halt illegal occupancy of land by nonagricultural projects.
RANDOLPH & Lou, supra note 31, at 28.
146. Rural Land Contracting Law, art. 16 (Aug. 29,2002), translated by Rural Development
Institute, Seattle, Wash.:
The contracting party shall enjoy the following rights:
1. the rights to use, profit from, and transfer land contracting and operation
rights, and the right of autonomy over production operations and
disposition of products;
2. when land is expropriated in accordance with law, to receive the
corresponding compensation as provided by law;
3. other rights that are set forth in laws and administrative regulations.
Id.; see also id. at art. 49:
Upon registration in accordance with law and issuance of written Land
Contracting and Operation Certificate, or Forest Right Certificate for rural land
that has been contracted through competitive bidding, auction, or public
negotiation or other forms of contracting, the contracting and operation rights
to such land may be assigned, leased, contributed as stock, mortgaged, or
transacted by other means.
Id.; accord Property Law of People's Republic of China, art. 132 (June 2003) (draft for
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also appear as a chapter in the proposed Property Code;'47 but as
the entire Code was not deemed ready, adoption of the Rural Land
Contracting Law has prevented delay of this badly needed stimulus
for economic development in China's poverty-stricken rural areas.
The Rural Land Contracting Law is discussed further in the next
Section of this Article in relation to its resolution of risks to land
tenure security resulting from conflicting goals of China's political
institution.
2. Risks Within the Political Institution
Laws adopted to enforce political policy also may inadvertently
conflict with the property rights institution's policy of land tenure
security. Because rights recognized by the political institution
often are created by statute or operation of law, rather than by
contract or instrument of conveyance, they do not appear in the land
registry. Thus, they pose a risk to investors that is not discernible
from the nation's land registry system, regardless of how accessible,
efficient or economical the system is.
Example 1: Readjustments of Land Use Rights in Agricultural
Collectives. Legal scholars recently exposed a conflict between goals
of China's political institution and its property rights institution
comments presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students, and
on file with author) ("Holder of contracted management rights of rural land enjoys the right
of transfer, subcontracting, exchanging, investing, gifting or mortgaging his contracted
management rights of rural land.").
Loan value will be limited, of course, by laws supporting the policy of China's public welfare
institution to guard strictly conversion of agricultural land from food production to other
purposes. A mortgagee, thus, may only acquire or sell to another in foreclosure subject to the
rights of the agricultural collective and for agricultural operations. Rural Land Contracting
Law, art. 33, 1 4 & 5; Contracted Management Rights of Rural Land, Property Law of
People's Republic of China, ch. 13, art. 128 (June 2003) (draft for comments presented by
Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students, and on file with author) ("It
is prohibited to alter the nature and the use of the land."); see also Right of Mortgage,
Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 23, art. 272 (June 2003) (draft for comments
presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students, and on file
with author):
Where the land-use right to contracted barren hills is mortgaged or the land-use
right to the land occupied by the factories and other buildings of a township
(town) or village enterprise is mortgaged in accordance with the provisions of
this Law, the collective ownership and the uses of the land may not be altered
without following the legal procedure after enforcement of the right of mortgage.
147. Property Law of People's Republic of China, art. 132 (quoted supra note 146).
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which has prevented agricultural collectives14 from achieving
their economic development goals. In an effort to increase agricul-
tural productivity, between 1978 and 1984, China moved from a
purely communal agricultural system to a "household responsibility
system." 49 Giving each household rights to farm and to profit from
the production of a specific parcel of land initially raised agricul-
tural production significantly.'50 Yet, productivity began to decrease
as time elapsed.' Legal scholars with the Rural Development
Institute in Washington posited that this decrease in productivity
occurred because farmers' land tenure rights still were insecure as
a result of village leaders periodically readjusting families' assign-
ments of land.5 2 If a member of a family died or a daughter married
and moved to another village, the household lost that member's land
share. 53 Conversely, a household into which a child was born or a
new spouse moved gained an additional land share.5 4 Furthermore,
as the village's overall population grew, village leaders would re-
subdivide and redistribute its land, with a consequent reduction in
the size of every individual's land share.' 5
This policy of readjustment likely was intended to achieve a goal
within the local political institution, such as that of treating each
person equally by making each person's landholding equal. Because
farmers risked losing the land they were farming, however, they
were discouraged from making long-term investments that might
otherwise have improved the land's productivity.5 6 Also, even
after China's property rights institution assured the alienability of
148. All land in China is owned either by the State or by agricultural collectives. The State
owns land in the cities, while agricultural collectives own land in rural and suburban
areas-including house sites, privately farmed plots of cropland, and "hilly land"-except for
portions that belong to the State under other provisions of the law. XIANFA [Constitution] art.
10 (amended 1988), translated in WAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 102-03; RANDOLPH & Lou,
supra note 31, at 59.
149. Brian Schwarzwalder, A Quiet Revolution Begins: Reinventing China's Farms, S.
CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 12, 2003, at 18, available at http'/www.rdiland.org/PDF/PDF-
Publications/SCMP-Schwarzwalder.pdf.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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farmers' land use rights, they in fact had no transferable or
mortgageable value for more than one season, because the trans-
feree risked losing the parcel in the next readjustment.15 7 After
learning of the contradictory effect of this political policy and
practice upon its economic goals, the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress increased farmers' land tenure security
by adopting the Rural Land Contracting Law, which grants farmers
thirty-year land use rights on their parcels of land.'58 The Rural
Development Institute estimates that by recognizing, clearly
defining, and securing farmers' in rem rights to land, this new
legislation will have unleashed land with a market value of at least
$500-600 billion.'59 Chapter 13 of the proposed Property Code, 160 if
passed, will reinforce that the farmer holds a right in rem in the
particular parcel, not merely a contract or credit right, with all
available remedies for enforcing a right in rem.
Example 2: Rights Created by Operation of Law That Override the
Registry. Even where a nation's property rights institution enforces
registered private rights in land, the political institution still may
give greater weight to certain rights of others. Two categories of
unregistered rights in land commonly are permitted to "override the
registry."16' First, the law may recognize private rights based on
possession that might have been ascertained by an inspection of
the land or by inquiry of persons in possession, such as residential
157. Id.
158. Id.; see also Rural Land Contracting Law, art. 20 (Aug. 29, 2002), translated by Rural
Development Institute, Seattle, Wash.
159. Roy L. Prosterman, China's New Market in Land, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2003,
available at http-/www.rdiland.org/PDF/PDFPublications/WSJ-RP.pdf (calling this figure
a "conservative short-term estimate").
Questions remain, however. Even if technically farmers can mortgage their land use rights,
will lenders be willing to loan money when they can only acquire in foreclosure subject to the
agricultural collective's rights? The lender would be limited to selling in foreclosure only to
someone else in the collective or subject to the collective's right. Also, the thirty-year limit on
the farmer's land use right raises the concern of insufficient loan funds for operations during
the last years of the term, since resale value of the land use right decreases as the end of the
term nears and a lender would not loan more than its market value.
160. Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 13, art. 127 (June 2003) (draft for
comments presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students, and
on file with author).
161. See, e.g., the list of "overriding interests" to which registered land may be subject in
England pursuant to § 70 of the Land Registration Act. Land Registration Act 2002, c. 9,
sched. 3.
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leases and easements by necessity, despite absence of a registered
document creating that right. A second category of overriding
interests include public rights, such as land taxes, land use reg-
ulations, certain public easements, and the government's right to
take privately owned land through eminent domain. 62 The publicity
generated when eminent domain or confiscatory regulation occurs
causes property owners to dread this risk to investment in land
even in developed countries. Moreover, when eminent domain or
confiscatory regulation occurs in a nation where private property
rights are relatively new, alarms are raised that can seriously
reduce purchasers' and investors' confidence in the nation's property
rights institution.
In China, recognized overriding interests that might be ascer-
tained by inspection of the land or by inquiry of persons in posses-
sion include neighborhood rights, spousal rights, and family rights.
The second category of overriding interests includes land taxes, land
use regulations, certain public easements, and the government's
right to terminate a transferee's land use right in the public interest
with appropriate compensation to the holder for loss of the land use
right.
Certainly, in China it has been true that the publicity generated
when the State terminates private land use rights and recovers the
land makes this one of the most feared risks. This risk was recently
illustrated by the Beijing district government's reclaiming the rights
to a man's 350-year-old traditional courtyard house in order to sell
the land to a bank for a ten-story bank building. The city compen-
sated the owner of the land use rights, but, according to newspaper
reports, the compensation represented only one-tenth of what the
government stood to receive from the bank being built on the site. 63
It also was highly publicized when a Beijing McDonald's lost its
twenty-year lease for the world's largest McDonald's.
[I1n December 1995, 2 years into the lease, McDonald's noticed
bulldozers leveling the structures adjacent to the 'Great Palace'.
To their chagrin, Hong Kong-based Li Kshing, one of the world's
wealthiest men, was backing a commercial-residential redevel-
162. Id.
163. Ian Johnson, House Demolition Marks the End to Suit, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 27,
2000, at 4.
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opment site two blocks away from Tianammen Square and this
meant Ronald had to pack his McNuggets and leave. Industry
experts say that McDonald's should more or less accept this as
a "part of doing business in a country whose rulers have placed
a higher emphasis on rapid redevelopment than on contractual
niceties." Though they complained quite publicly and managed
to get a weak promise from the administration to receive a
future comparable site, McDonald's appears to understand that
this is the risk of doing business in China."6
To reduce their effect on investment, legal scholars recommended
in general that any laws preserving public or private rights in land
over purchasers' and lenders' registered rights should be express
and as clear as possible. 65 As a particular example, legal scholars
recommended that China clarify its law by codifying the measure of
compensation the State is to pay when terminating a private land
use right." Legal scholars also recommended that the State's power
should be expressly limited for legitimate public purposes. If the
State frequently and unevenly imposes confiscatory regulations,
misuses the right of eminent domain for private benefit, or refuses
to pay compensation equal to the fair market value of the land use
right, then a market for land and the availability of credit with real
164. Id. The Asian Wall Street Journal reported that McDonald's China Development
Company President, Marvin Whaley, considers its "continuing tussle with central and Beijing
government officials over the fate of its flagship restaurant on the comer of Beijing's busiest
shipping street" to be no more than a "bump on the road." Id.
Mr. Whaley says the media may have mistakenly overblown what is essentially
a commercial and urban-planning decision into a soap opera pitting foreign
business against the Chinese government and a Hong Kong billionaire. He says
McDonald's fully expects to give way to progress and knows it will receive an
equitable settlement. "Things are very complicated in China because they're
trying to do so much," he says. "Well come to an agreement that is suitable for
us and suitable for them. We have a very good working relationship with the
city. They'll compensate us."
McDonald's Can Smell Success in China, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1995, available at
http://www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/asian-3dec95.html.
165. Schwarzwalder, supra note 20, at 185.
The risk of "overriding interests" that are not reflected in the public land title registry is
one reason that investment analysts have begun to recommend private title insurance when
investments involve land, even in countries with strong land title registration systems.
Palomar, supra note 4, at 13.
166. See, e.g., Palomar, supra note 4, at 7; Joyce Palomar, Comments on the Draft Property
Law of People's Republic of China, supra note 128; Comments by Prof Patrick A Randolph
& Prof. Lou Jianbo, supra note 48.
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property collateral will be hindered. Conversely, if these protections
are express in the law and the rule of law controls, then the risk to
private owners from these overriding interests should not be so
great as to deter investment in land.
China has implemented some of the recommended clarifi-
cations of its law. Article 16 of the Rural Land Contracting Law that
became effective in March 2003 expressly provides that even in
agricultural collectives, if land must be expropriated according to
law, the land use rights holder has a right to compensation.
167
Additionally, the proposed Property Code for China mandates in
Article 44 that the government may only acquire private property
for the public interest and must pay compensation.' Article 177
reaffirms these principles in the context of rural homestead rights,
providing that a "rural collective economic organization may reclaim
a homestead for the sake of building public facilities or improving
public welfare, but the holder to the use of homestead should be
compensated and given a reallocated homestead."169 Article 45 adds
that if the government needs to use private property in case of
emergency, disaster relief, or war, the expropriatee shall be
compensated and expropriated land shall be returned to the
expropriatee after the need for its use has ceased.'
1 0
3. Risks from Conflicts with Other Institutions' Goals
Just as the policies and practices of a nation's political institution
and finance and credit institution must be balanced with those of
the property rights institution, so must the policies and practices
of a nation's other institutions be examined for their impact on
land tenure and investment security. Within the family protection
institution, risks to purchasers' land titles and investors' expecta-
tions can exist as a consequence of spousal rights, homestead rights,
liens for child support, and claims of heirs.171 Within the state's
167. Rural Land Contracting Law, art. 16 (Aug. 29, 2002), translated by Rural Development
Institute, Seattle Wash.
168. Property Law of People's Republic of China, art. 44 (June 2003) (draft for comments
presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated by Tsinghua Univ. law students, and on file
with author).
169. Id. at art. 177.
170. Id. at art. 45.
171. See, e.g., PALOMAR, PATRON & PALOMAR ON LAND TrrLEs, supra note 40, at ch. 5, § 225,
105120041
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police power and criminal justice institutions, risks to lenders'
security interests and investors' expectations exist from laws and
enforcement mechanisms providing for forfeiture of land used in
perpetration of a crime or purchased with the proceeds of a crime.'72
Within a nation's business organizations institution, rules that
empower business entities to acquire, hold, and transfer land also
prescribe the authority and formalities required for such entities
to transfer land validly; lack of authority or breach of formalities
can result in invalidity or unenforceability of a transfer.'73 Weak
institutions charged with building regulation create a risk that the
value of improvements to land will depreciate to an amount lower
than the borrower's loan balance, encouraging defaults on repay-
ment of mortgage loans and discouraging mortgage lending.
As demonstrated above, legal scholars can positively assist econ-
omists and development specialists with this sort of analysis of an
emerging economy's institutions. If they can discern where risks
exist, legal scholars, development experts, and legislators then will
be able to devise appropriate means for reducing those risks.
CONCLUSION
This Article illustrated that risks to purchasers' land rights and
investors' security interests in land exist when various institu-
tions in an emerging economy implement policies and practices
that inadvertently oppose the laws, enforcement mechanisms, and
supporting institutions of its property rights institution. This Article
also illustrated that risks to land tenure security arise when lack
of familiarity with the institution of private property rights in
land makes it difficult initially for legislators to promulgate laws,
regulations, and enforcement mechanisms that are sufficiently
comprehensive and clear. In addition, this Article has shown that
risks to land tenure security exist due to failure of process in
implementing existing laws and registering private titles to land. It
has demonstrated further that risks to land tenure security and
economic development exist when the law must make a conscious
ch. 8, §§ 395-400, ch. 10 & ch. 11, §§ 573, 575--576, 595-597.
172. See, e.g., id. at ch. 12, § 660.
173. See, e.g., id. at ch. 8, §§ 402-417.
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choice in balancing interests of other institutions against interests
of private owners of land rights.
After exposing such risks to land tenure security, the next step
will be for legal scholars to help economists and development
specialists devise institutions for reducing risks to the property
rights institution's goals. The means of risk reduction simply will
differ depending on the reason for the risk. Part II of this Article
illustrated how legal scholars in China reached to the rule of law
and legislation as mechanisms for supporting the nation's property
rights institution and reducing risks to land tenure security and
investment in land. The draft of a new Property Code proposed to
the National People's Congress recognizes and supports diverse
forms of private rights in land with the goal of sustaining China's
socialist market economy.
174
Risks to land tenure security also may be reduced by improve-
ments to land title registration systems and through private
contracts of indemnification. Future work by legal scholars should
consider means of tailoring these two institutions for land title
assurance to the needs of emerging economies. A forthcoming work
by this author will recommend adaptations to make land title
registry systems sustainable as well as types of private contracts of
indemnification best suited to reduce risk of loss to purchasers,
lenders, and investors in emerging countries. 175
174. Property Law of People's Republic of China, ch. 1, art. 3 (June 2003) (draft for
comments presented by Professor Jiang Ping, translated byTsinghua Univ. law students, and
on file with author) ("Individual economy, private economy and other nonpublic economy are
important constituents of a socialist market economy. In the primary stage of socialism, the
State holds as the basic economic system the common development of the diverse forms of
ownership, with the public ownership as the mainstay.").
175. The author, in Broadening Perspectives on Land Registration Systems for Credit
Enhancement in Emerging Economies (unpublished manuscript), will recommend: (1)
mortgage impairment insurance to stimulate a market for residential mortgage-backed
securities, instead of title insurance, and (2) a system of recording title evidence rather than
a registry of rights in certain types of localities.
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